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The Fate of Nationalism in the New
States: Southeast Asia in Comparative
Historical Perspective
JOHN T. SIDEL
London School of Economics
In two landmark essays published in 1973, the eminent anthropologist Clifford
Geertz offered an early assessment of what he termed “The Fate of Nationalism
in the New States,” referring to the newly independent nation-states of Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East.1 Ranging with characteristic ease and flair
across Burma, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, and Nigeria,
Geertz argued that an “Integrative Revolution” was under way, but one compli-
cated and compromised by the inherent tension between “essentialism” and
“epochalism,” between “Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New
States.” Geertz argued:
The peoples of the new states are simultaneously animated by two powerful, thoroughly
interdependent, yet distinct and often actually opposed motives—the desire to be recog-
nized as responsible agents whose wishes, acts, hopes, and opinions “matter,” and the
desire to build an efficient, dynamic modern state. The one aim is to be noticed: it is
a search for identity, and a demand that the identity be publicly acknowledged as
having import, a social assertion of the self as “being somebody in the world.” The
other aim is practical: it is a demand for progress, for a rising standard of living,
more effective political order, greater social justice, and beyond that of “playing a
part in the larger arena of world politics,” of “exercising influence among the nations.”2
“It is, in fact,”Geertz concluded, “the tension between them that is one of the
central driving forces in the national evolution of the new states; as it is, at the
Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank Andrew Shryock and the journal’s readers for
their extremely perceptive comments and constructive criticisms of successive drafts of this essay.
Needless to say, time and space constraints have made it impossible to address all of the concerns
raised by these readers, and the remaining inadequacies of the essay are the responsibility of the
author alone.
1 Clifford Geertz, “After the Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in the New States,” and “The
Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,” both in The
Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 234–54, 255–310.
2 Geertz, “Integrative Revolution,” 258.
Comparative Studies in Society and History 2012;54(1):114–144.
0010-4175/12 $15.00 # Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 2012
doi:10.1017/S0010417511000612
114
same time, one of the greatest obstacles to such evolution.”3 This tension, he
argued, was especially acute in the “new states” of Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East because of the ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of their
societies. These new states varied widely in their responses to this tension:
“a withdrawal into don’t-touch-me isolationism, as in Burma; a surge of neo-
traditionalism, as in Algeria; a turn toward regional imperialism as in
precoup Indonesia; an obsession with a neighboring enemy, as in Pakistan; a
collapse into ethnic civil war, as in Nigeria; or, in the majority of the cases
where the conflict is for the moment less severe, an underdeveloped version
of muddling-through, which contains a little of all these plus a certain
amount of whistling in the dark.”4 To explain this kaleidoscopic pattern of vari-
ation, Geertz emphasized “concrete patterns of primordial diversity and differ-
ent modes of political response to those patterns.”5 The varying fate of
nationalism in the new states, he suggested, depended on the nature and
extent of societal diversity, on one hand, and the success of state leaders in
managing such diversity, on the other.
Nearly forty years after Geertz published this essay, a distinctly Geertzian
approach still dominates the study of post-independence nationalism in South-
east Asia today. Leading historians have reasserted the importance of ethnicity
in the making of modern nation-states in the region.6 Anthropologists have
focused attention on interactions between national state policies and ethnic
minorities across Southeast Asia, whether the small but disproportionately
wealthy immigrant “Chinese” communities or the poor upland populations of
the region.7 Meanwhile, political scientists have devoted considerable energy
to the study of separatist struggles and ethnic conflicts in countries like
Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, while emphasizing the diffi-
culties of managing ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity within these
nation-states.8
But with the benefit of almost forty years of hindsight, accumulated scholar-
ship, and continuing political change in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, it is
possible to look back on the fate of nationalism in the new states through a
somewhat different—and clearer—lens from that supplied by Geertz in 1973.
Focusing on post-independence Southeast Asia, this essay offers a comparative
3 Ibid.
4 Geertz, “After the Revolution,” 237–38.
5 Geertz, “Integrative Revolution,” 278.
6 See, for example, Anthony Reid, Imperial Alchemy: Nationalism and Political Identity in
Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
7 Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1999); Christopher R. Duncan, ed., Civilizing the Margins: Southeast Asian Gov-
ernment Policies for the Development of Minorities (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
8 Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2004); Jacques Bertrand and André Laliberté, eds., Multination States in Asia:
Accommodation or Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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analysis of “the fate of nationalism in the new states.” It examines and explains
the diversity of trajectories across the region in ways that move beyond
what Geertz described as “a series of snapshot pictures of the ‘integrative revolu-
tion’ as it seems to be proceeding in several selected new states.”9 In what
follows, all ten countries of Southeast Asia save tiny Brunei—that is, Burma,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam,
and Thailand—are examined, albeit briefly and schematically, in an effort to
analyze the whole of the region as well as the sum of its constituent parts.
A X E S O F C OM PA R I S O N : C O L O N I A L S TAT E F O RMAT I O N A N D C O L D WAR
I N T E G R AT I O N
Among the newly independent nation-states of Southeast Asia, the fate of
nationalism, I will argue, hinged less on management of internal ethnic diver-
sity than on problems of reintegrating former colonial economies and state
structures within the world capitalist economy and the Cold War global politi-
cal order on the basis of national independence. Here it is useful to recall the
tortured maneuvers and tragic fates of figures like Burma’s U Nu, Cambodia’s
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and Indonesia’s Soekarno as they struggled to carve
out a modicum of economic autonomy and political neutrality in the 1950s and
1960s in the context of continuing economic linkages to old colonial metro-
poles and intensifying American intervention in the region. Between the “neo-
colonial” option of continuing openness to Western capital and facilities for
U.S. and British military forces exemplified by Malaysia, Singapore, the Phi-
lippines, and Thailand, and the “anti-imperialist” option of state-socialist
nationalization of economies and incorporation within the Soviet Bloc even-
tually exercised by Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the choices were limited
and costly, including the putative choice of “neutrality.” Viewed in this
light, the first and most important axis of variation across Southeast Asia is
not Geertz’s “integrative revolution” within variously configured multiethnic
constellations, but rather the mode of post-independence reintegration into
the world capitalist economy and the global political order, whether
through “passive revolution,” socialist revolution, or counter-revolution of
some kind.
Along a secondary axis of variation, moreover, the trajectories of nation-
alism in Southeast Asia since independence are also aligned with a clear pattern
of divergence between peninsular and archipelagic areas of the region, in terms
of what has constituted “nationalism” in the first place. In Mainland Southeast
Asia—Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam—nationalism is, in
Geertz’s terms, strikingly “essentialist” and “primordial,” with existing nation-
states and even those aspired to by separatist movements overwhelmingly
9 Geertz, “Integrative Revolution,” 278.
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understood to represent the timeless existence and time-tested endurance of
core ethnies, whether Burmese, Khmer, Lao, Thai, or Vietnamese, or even
Karen, Mon, Chin, or Shan. Mainland Southeast Asians, it appears, are “peren-
nialists,” fully paid-up subscribers to Anthony Smith’s account of The Ethnic
Origins of Nations.10 Thailand is especially emblematic of this pattern: “In
Thailand today there is a widespread assumption that there is such a thing as
common Thai nature or identity: khwampenthai (Thainess). It is believed to
have existed for a long time, and all Thai are supposed to be well aware of
its virtue. The essence of Thainess has been well preserved up to the present
time despite the fact that Siam has been transformed greatly toward moderniz-
ation in the past hundred years.”11
A very different situation has developed in Island Southeast Asia (i.e.,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore), where nationalism has been
notably “epochalist” in nature, with existing nation-states and even those
aspired to by separatist movements predominantly perceived as aspirational,
constructed creations of political struggle, whether “bottom-up” through revo-
lution or “top-down” through social engineering. Island Southeast Asians, it
seems, are “modernists” and adherents to Benedict Anderson’s constructivist
account of the origins and spread of nationalism in Imagined Communities.12
If the underlying premise of nationalism in Mainland Southeast Asia is one
of continuity and conservation of identities found in conditions of inherent full-
ness, in Island Southeast Asia it is one of invention and aspiration with regard
to identities seen as incomplete and still very much in the making.
This sharply dichotomous difference in conceptions of nationalism in
Southeast Asia can be attributed to diverging patterns of state formation,
from the early modern period up through the colonial era. In Mainland South-
east Asia, it has been argued, the half-millennium stretching from 1350 through
1850 witnessed a process of European-style war-making and state-making that
reduced the more than twenty independent but small and loosely structured
realms found in the mid-fourteenth century to a handful of large, consolidated,
absolutizing kingdoms along the Chaophraya, Irrawaddy, Mekong, and Red
rivers, in whose increasingly powerful orbit were found a diminishing set of
smaller, weaker, tribute-paying principalities. As inland agrarian states of
Mainland Southeast Asia developed increasingly coherent and centralized mili-
tary, fiscal, and administrative structures to defend themselves against their
neighbors, this cycle of war-making and state-making encouraged not only
monetization and commercialization, land settlement and reclamation, but
10 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
11 Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of the Nation (Honolulu:
University of Hawaìi Press, 1994), 3.
12 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
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also increasing homogenization of language, culture, and religion in expanding
central zones of state power, prefiguring “Burmese,” “Thai,” and “Vietnamese”
ethnic cores of nations-to-be.13 However embryonic or advanced this process of
early modern state formation might have been by the mid-nineteenth century, in
the eyes of today’s historians, it clearly made possible, if not inevitable,
colonial-era state policies in which the timeless existence and time-tested endur-
ance of “Burmese,” “Khmers,” “Thais,” “Vietnamese,” and “Laos” were estab-
lished as potential bases for the construction of national identities and boundaries.
Indeed, this pattern of state formation in the early modern era set the stage
for the crystallization of a distinctly essentialist form of nationalism across
Mainland Southeast Asia in the colonial era. It was with “Burmese,”
“Khmers,” “Laos,” “Thais,” and “Vietnamese” in mind that languages were
standardized, histories written, and borders mapped over the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.14 As scholars have shown, these very same pro-
cesses also unfolded in the nominally independent realm known as Siam under
the Chakkri dynasty in Bangkok, with British and French pressures, indirect
colonialism, self-conscious efforts at emulation, and absolutist rule producing
a decidedly Thai-ified Thailand by the 1930s.15
Island Southeast Asia was different: there, the early modern era brought
neither a war-making/state-making cycle along peninsular lines, nor a corre-
sponding process of ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogenization in the
direction of increasing “coherence,” but rather an imposed disjuncture
between the formation of states and that of collective identities. From the mid-
sixteenth century, archipelagic Southeast Asia was increasingly subordinated to
European imperial control, with early Spanish rule in the Philippines, gradual
consolidation of Dutch control over Java and other islands of the Indonesian
archipelago, and belated British colonization of the Malay Peninsula,
Penang, and Singapore, and the northern shelf of Borneo. In contrast to the cen-
tralizing trends in Mainland Southeast Asia, colonial rule in Island Southeast
Asia remained markedly fragmented, with indirect rule in the Netherlands
East Indies and British Malaya persisting into the twentieth century, even as
13 Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830: Volume
1: Integration on the Mainland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
14 See: Penny Edwards,Cambodge: The Cultivation of a Nation, 1860–1945 (Honolulu: Univer-
sity of Hawaìi Press, 2007); Christopher E. Goscha, “Annam and Vietnam in the New Indochinese
Space, 1887–1945,” in Hans Antlöv and Stein Tønnesson, eds., Asian Forms of the Nation
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 1996), 93–130; Søren Ivarsson, Creating Laos: The Making of a
Lao Space between Indochina and Siam, 1860–1945 (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian
Studies, 2008); Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (London: C. Hurst, 1987).
15 See Winichakul, Siam Mapped; David Streckfuss, “The Mixed Colonial Legacy in Siam:
Origins of Thai Racialist Thought, 1890–1910,” in Laurie J. Sears, ed., Autonomous Histories, Par-
ticular Truths: Essays in Honor of John R. W. Smail (Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for
Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 123–53; and the various fine essays in Rachel V. Harrison and Peter
A. Jackson, eds., The Ambiguous Allure of the West: Traces of the Colonial in Thailand (Ithaca:
Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 2010).
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American colonial rule in the Philippines saw rapid Filipinization of the
bureaucracy and its subordination to locally elected Filipino mayors, gover-
nors, and congressmen. This pattern of more decentralized, fragmented, and
proto-federal state structures spelled much greater ambiguity and uncertainty—
if not always openness and flexibility—with regard to the meaning of Indone-
sian, Malaysian, and Philippine national identities. As we shall see, in the
absence of a credible correspondence between coherent “ethnic core” and
nation-state, nationalism in the new states of Island Southeast Asia was
destined to revolve around becoming Indonesians, Malaysians, and Filipinos,
rather than, as in the Mainland nation-states, being Burmese, Cambodian,
Lao, Thai, or Vietnamese. This abiding difference between Mainland and
Island Southeast Asia decisively shaped the diverging fates of nationalism in
the new states in the formative period of transition to independence in the
global context of the Cold War.
In short, the varying “fate of nationalism” in the new states of Southeast
Asia has not followed from “different modes of political response” to “concrete
patterns of primordial diversity,” as suggested by Geertz and commonly under-
stood to this day. Instead, I assert, the trajectories of Southeast Asian national-
ism were prefigured by diverging modes of post-independence (re)integration
into the world economy and the geo-political order of the Cold War period, and
by different structures of national identity inherited from early modern and
colonial eras of state formation. The remainder of this essay provides a com-
parative analysis of these diverging trajectories, using three paired comparisons
to illuminate the explanatory power of these arguments.
Following Geertz, this essay provides not an ethnography, but rather a com-
parative historical sociology of nationalism in Southeast Asia. Constraints of space
preclude a more serious and sustained engagement with the rich ethnographic lit-
erature on nationalism in the region. Furthermore, the very structure of the argu-
ment favors a wide-angle perspective “from above” at the expense of a more
subtle and nuanced appreciation of ambiguities and ambivalences, indifference
and resistance, to be found “below” in the lived experiences of ordinary people.
Therefore, by “nationalism” what is meant here is not based on any assumptions
as to the depth or breadth of “national identity” or “nationalist consciousness”
among the broad mass of the population. Following Rogers Brubaker and Freder-
ick Cooper, I move “beyond identity,”16 and, emulating Srirupa Roy’s work on
India, “beyond belief,” that is, “beyond discussions of national identity as an
internalized belief, and of effective nationalizing practices as those that engender
unisonant sentiments of love, loyalty, and belonging.”17 Instead, nationalism is
16 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity,’” Theory and Society 29, 1 (Feb.
2000): 1–47.
17 Srirupa Roy, Beyond Belief: India and the Politics of Postcolonial Nationalism (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2007), 15.
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understood here in terms of a discursive and material field within which pol-
itical action is structured, in such ways as to reaffirm and reproduce represen-
tation and recognition of the nation-state.18 With independence in the
aftermath of World War II, the bases of nationalism throughout Southeast
Asia shifted from nationalist movements to nation-states. But these new
states varied considerably in terms of the nature and extent of their success
in the making and remaking of nations in the post-independence era, accord-
ing to a pattern suggested above and which I will now spell out, country by
country, in a series of paired comparisons.
S I AM AND I T S TW I N ? : T H A I L A N D AND T H E P H I L I P P I N E S
The fate of nationalism in Thailand and the Philippines over the past sixty years
was destined to be less politically problematic and contentious than elsewhere
in the region. The two countries entered the Cold War era without the tumul-
tuous patterns of mass mobilization and tortuous processes of transition to inde-
pendence seen in other parts of Southeast Asia. Thailand remained the only
major territory in the region to escape direct colonization by the Western
powers, and was likewise spared Japanese invasion during World War II.
The Philippines, while colonized thrice over—by the Spanish, the Americans,
and the Japanese—and devastated by war in 1942–1945, was awarded indepen-
dence not as a result of sustained nationalist struggle but as part of a planned
Filipinization and phasing-out of American colonial rule that predated the
Pacific War. In both countries national identity was associated not with disrup-
tive early postwar mass mobilization, but rather with the restoration of the
status quo ante bellum.
Against this backdrop, national sovereignty in Thailand and the Philip-
pines did not stand in the way of compromisingly close ties with the new imper-
ial power, the United States, and incorporation into its geopolitical orbit during
the Cold War. Close linkages were established between the Thai and Philippine
military establishments and the Pentagon, and the Central Intelligence Agency
was actively involved in “internal security” through domestic counterinsur-
gency programs. Both countries received considerable military assistance and
security guarantees against external threats. Both also hosted important U.S.
military installations—the single largest overseas U.S. naval base was at
Subic Bay in the Philippines, and Thailand served as a vast “aircraft carrier”
for U.S. bombing missions in Indochina and a base for tens of thousands of
American troops in Vietnam from the mid-1960s into the early 1970s.19
18 Ibid., 1–31.
19 W. Scott Thompson, Unequal Partners: Philippine and Thai Relations with the United States,
1965–1975 (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975); Stephen R. Shalom, The United States and
the Philippines: A Study of Neo-Colonialism (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues,
1981); and Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in
Thailand, 1947–1958 (Honolulu: University of Hawaìi Press, 1997).
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The early and virtually uninterrupted integration of Thailand and the Phi-
lippines into the world economy from the mid-nineteenth century prefigured
parallel limitations on early postwar “economic nationalism.” Colonial-era
state policies promoting assimilation and integration of Chinese immigrants
had produced Sino-Thai and Chinese-mestizo business classes in Thailand
and the Philippines, which limited the appeal of early postwar schemes promot-
ing “national capital” against “foreign” Chinese competition and control
through state and affirmative interventions, which enjoyed far greater popular-
ity elsewhere in the region.20 In both countries, openness to foreign trade,
investment, and ownership remained largely unimpeded by the sorts of restric-
tions imposed by more “nationalist” governments. Early postwar experiments
with import-substitution gave way to export-oriented industrialization by the
1970s and 1980s, with foreign-owned manufacturing firms promoted as the
key engines of economic growth. Overall, in both political and economic
terms, nationalism in Thailand and the Philippines remained quite conservative
in the sense of its compatibility with continuing external—“imperialist”—inter-
vention in the political realm and foreign control in the economy. This differed
sharply from patterns observed elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
Alongside these similarities in Thai and Philippine nationalism there
were important differences between them. In Thailand, new efforts to
promote Thai national identity began to crystallize by the late 1950s and
persisted under centralized military rule until into the early 1970s. The
pattern of state formation under the absolutist Chakkri dynasty facilitated
top-down imposition of coherent conservative notions of Thai nationhood
under authoritarian auspices during the early Cold War era. As schools stea-
dily expanded and extended into mass university education during this period,
and as national newspapers and radio and television stations gained an
increasingly broad audience, government ministries in Bangkok worked to
bring coherence to the meaning of the Thai nation. The Central Thai
dialect was promoted as the standardized form of “Thai” at the expense of
other linguistic forms; the map of a timeless Thailand was established as
the basis for the geo-body of the Thai nation.21 A conspicuously state-
centered account of Thai history was instilled in schoolchildren across the
country, which lionized the Chakkri Dynasty for its putative defense of the
Thai realm against foreign encroachment, preservation of Thai culture, and
modernization of the country, even as “the Thai people” remained inert and
20 G. William Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand: An Analytical History (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1957); Edgar Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850–1898 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1965); Frank H. Golay, ed., Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism
in Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969).
21 Anthony Diller, “What Makes Central Thai a National Language?” in Craig Reynolds, ed.,
National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand, 1939–1989 (Clayton, Victoria: Monash Papers on
Southeast Asia, 1991), 87–132; Winichakul, Siam Mapped, 128–74.
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invisible in the making of Thailand.22 The same early postwar decades also
saw a broader public restoration of the monarchy to a central role in national
identity. The young king Bhumibol Adulyadej was positioned by successive
military rulers as the embodiment of the Thai nation through an ever-
widening range of official duties and state rituals, his long service as head
of state and titular chief of the armed forces, and his role as patron of rural
development programs and diverse philanthropic activities.23 Over succes-
sive decades, in these capacities and in his episodic interventions in Thai poli-
tics, the king came to occupy an authoritative—indeed, authoritarian—
position in the hierarchical and conservative “imagining” of the Thai nation:
The image of the King is ubiquitous in Thailand. His portraits adorn the shacks of the
rural poor and the air-conditioned offices of the multinationals, austere Buddhist
temples and back-alley brothels, the huge billboards that line the congested city
streets, the banknotes and coins in everyone’s pockets. Identical newsreels showing
the latest public functions of the King and Royal Family are broadcast at 8 p.m.
every evening on the six free TV channels….
The King has methodically stamped his imprint on the life-course of virtually every
member of the country’s elites. For over forty years, every university graduate has for-
mally received his or her degree from the hand of the King; every military or police
general has been personally ‘knighted’ by him in a solemn ceremony. By tradition
that glorious moment is given pride of place in every office or living room. The omni-
present benign, fatherly images look innocuous enough until one realizes that what they
represent is indeed the totalizing embodiment of Thai statehood and public morality;
then one begins to have a peculiar feeling of being watched everywhere, all the time.24
Over successive decades, however, economic growth, industrialization, and
urbanization began to produce new popular challenges to the hegemony of roy-
alist official Thai nationalism. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a new gener-
ation of university students in Bangkok, agitated by U.S. intervention in
neighboring Indochina, began to mobilize in new ways in the name of “the
Thai people.” In 1973 a student-led democracy movement triumphed over
the long-entrenched military dictatorship, and the following years brought
the country’s first genuinely free and competitive elections and its most
liberal constitution to date. The widening of political space began to allow
for an expanded notion of “the Thai people,” a decidedly anti-imperialist under-
standing of Thai nationalism, and an implicitly republican understanding of
national sovereignty. A conservative reaction soon set in, encouraged and
assisted by the monarchy, especially after the fall of Phnom Penh, Saigon,
22 Benedict Anderson, “Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies,” in Eliezer B. Ayal,
ed., The Study of Thailand: Analyses of Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in Anthropology,
Art History, Economics, History, and Political Science (Athens: Ohio University Center for Inter-
national Studies, 1978), 193–233.
23 Paul M. Handley, The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 139–79; Thak Chaloemtiarana, The Politics of Despotic
Paternalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 2007).
24 Kasian Tejapira, “Toppling Thaksin,” New Left Review 39 (May/June 2006): 17–18.
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and Vientiane to Communist forces in 1975.25 Already by the late 1960s the
king had begun to allude more and more explicitly to the threat of communism
in Thailand and in neighboring Indochina as a “foreign” menace to the unity of
nation, religion, and king. By the mid-1970s, the royal family had emerged as
official sources of inspiration and patronage for U.S.-backed counterinsurgency
campaigns up-country, while backing anti-communist groups in Bangkok.26
When conservative forces massacred student activists accused of insulting
the monarchy and engineered a military coup in 1976 the king defended
them and described the events as “a manifestation of what the people clearly
wanted.”27
With violent crackdown on popular nationalism in Bangkok and effective
elimination of the Communist Party of Thailand insurgency up-country, by the
early 1980s royalist official nationalism had regained its hegemonic position, at
times enforced by stringent lèse-majesté legislation. As democratization devel-
oped over subsequent decades, the king largely succeeded in repositioning
himself as a neutral arbiter with the nation’s best interests at heart. He publicly
protected the Prem administration through much of the 1980s, blessed a mili-
tary coup against a notoriously corrupt elected government in 1991, ostensibly
encouraged restoration of civilian, democratic rule after mass protests in
mid-1992, and championed “reform” and recovery in the wake of the Asian
economic crisis of 1997–1998, even as his minions continued to exercise a
powerful influence in Thai politics behind the scenes.28
By the turn of the new millennium, however, the monarchy’s position as
idealized embodiment of “Thainess” had become increasingly problematic.
With the landslide victory of the Thai Rak Thai (“Thais Love Thai”) Party in
the 2001 elections and the elevation of Sino-Thai business tycoon Thaksin Shi-
nawatra as prime minister, the country’s previously fragmented parliament and
coalition-based cabinet was replaced by a much more centralized, almost pre-
sidential form of elected civilian rule. Unlike his predecessors, Thaksin had
won election on his own, through populist appeals to rural and urban poor
voters and the construction of a centralized political machine of unprecedented
reach and resources. He could therefore claim to represent the Thai people
directly, something previously reserved for King Bhumibol.29 As Thaksin
aggregated power and asserted, indeed abused, his authority as prime minister
25 Ben Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup,”
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 9, 3 (July–Sept. 1977), 13–30.
26 Katherine Bowie, Rituals of National Loyalty: An Anthropology of the State and the Village
Scout Movement in Thailand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
27 Handley, The King Never Smiles, 260.
28 Duncan McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” Pacific Review
18, 4 (Dec. 2005), 499–519.
29 Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen:
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2004); Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin: The
Business of Politics in Thailand (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2004).
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beyond what any of his civilian predecessors had attempted, he eventually ran
up against rising protests from the liberal, urban middle-class intelligentsia in
Bangkok, and increasing opposition from the palace and its allies. In 2006,
after months of protests, Thaksin was overthrown by a palace-backed military
coup and forced into exile to avoid prosecution for corruption and abuse of
office.30 Then, when elections in 2007 produced a victory for pro-Thaksin
forces, protests and prosecutorial efforts resumed, championed by the
People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) but also strongly backed by the
palace. By 2008, the prime minister had been forced to resign and Thaksin
had fled once again into exile; a wave of PAD-led, palace-backed protests
forced the new prime minister, Thaksin’s brother-in-law, to give way to a
fragile new coalition government, which itself soon confronted sporadic,
large-scale Thaksin-backed protests. Elections in 2011 produced a landslide
victory for a pro-Thaksin party and the elevation of his sister, Yingluck Shina-
watra, to the premiership.
The protracted stalemate in Bangkok has revealed both the clear partisan-
ship of the king and the limits of his effectiveness in manipulating Thai politics
from the sidelines. As the aging king enters the twilight of his reign, the future
of royalist official nationalism in Thailand remains in grave doubt, and the pos-
sibilities for popular, republican forms of nationalism loom large on the
horizon. The long-term trends are clear: a broadening and loosening of what
it means to be Thai, and what Thai nationalism might mean for future
generations.31
In stark contrast with the centralized, consolidated, and conservative form
of official nationalism found in Thailand, nationalism in the Philippines has
been since independence in 1946 much less tied to the institutions and
symbols of state power and more available for popular forms of appropriation,
representation, and mobilization. With its decentralized, American-style presi-
dential democracy, the Philippines always lacked an Archimedean point from
which an avowedly neutral, institutionalized embodiment of the national inter-
est could be articulated and asserted. Instead of a strongly state-centered
national identity imposed top-down from the national capital, as in Thailand,
something much less defined and didactic, and much more diffuse and
demotic, began to emerge “from below” through popular representations and
struggles styled as “Filipino.” The first signs of this nascent popular national-
ism appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the growth of a lively
student movement in the universities that protested, inter alia, the ongoing
use of U.S. military bases in the Philippines in the war in Indochina and the
30 Thongchai Winichakul, “Toppling Democracy,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, 1 (Feb.
2008): 11–37.
31 See: Michael K. Connors, “Article of Faith: The Failure of Royal Liberalism in Thailand,”
Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, 1 (Feb. 2008): 143–65.
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“parity rights” enjoyed by U.S. companies in the exploitation of the archipela-
go’s natural resources.32
When then-president Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, the
Philippines experienced its version of Thailand’s 1976, except that Marcos
failed to impose a hegemonic, state-based official nationalism. Student acti-
vists, forced underground and further radicalized by martial law rule, revived
the moribund Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and built up the
New People’s Army (NPA) in the 1970s. By the 1980s, closely affiliated
groups had mobilized hundreds of thousands if not millions of peasants,
workers, and urban poor folk against a common nationalist target: the so-called
“U.S.-Marcos Dictatorship.”33 By the mid-1980s, through strikes, street dem-
onstrations, semi-clandestine meetings, and protest literature, this movement
had swelled in tandem with the growth of the New People’s Army in many
provinces, creating a nation-wide, popular nationalist, counter-hegemonic
language and culture of protest. The New Nationalist Alliance (Bagong Alyan-
sang Makabayan, or BAYAN) was the leading leftist umbrella group, and the
folk singer Freddie Aguilar’s ballad “Bayan Ko” (My Country) became the
theme song of the campaign that finally toppled the Marcos regime in
1986.34 This sustained, popular nationalist mobilization was unparalleled in
breadth, depth, and duration elsewhere in Southeast Asia during this period.
While popular mobilization in the Philippines peaked and subsided in the
mid-1980s, notions of Filipino national identity have continued to circulate and
cohere in distinctively popular form. Already by the 1970s, the expanding cir-
cuitries of the national media industry had, through Tagalog movies and televi-
sion shows, succeeded in connecting millions of Filipinos to a common
“imagined community” in Tagalog—or “Pilipino”—reinforced by analogous
trends in the production and distribution of consumer goods for a truly national
market.35 Concurrently, the increasing international circulation of Filipino
laborers has worked to enhance and define the representation and celebration
of the Filipino experience. The growing numbers of Filipino overseas contract
workers (OCWs)—working as construction laborers, domestic servants, mer-
chant seamen, nurses, and in a variety of other occupations in Asia, Australia,
Europe, the Middle East, and North America—have helped promote a new kind
of “long-distance nationalism” that stretches far beyond the Philippines. With
32 José F. Lacaba,Days of Disquiet, Nights of Rage: The First Quarter Storm and Related Events
(Manila: Asphodel Books, 1986).
33 Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement (Boulder: West-
view Press, 1989); Benjamin Pimentel, Jr., Edjop: The Unusual Journey of Edgar Jopson (Quezon
City: KEN, 1989).
34 Aurora Javate-de Dios, Petronilo Bn. Dary, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, eds., Dictatorship and
Revolution: Roots of People Power (Manila: Conspectus, 1988).
35 Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, “The Spectre of Populism in Philippine Politics and Society: Artista,
Masa, Eraption!” South East Asia Research 9, 1 (Mar. 2001): 5–44.
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millions of OCWs clustering in Filipino labor niches and enclaves and sending
billions of pesos home to their loved ones each year, it could hardly be
otherwise.36
Indeed, the shared hardships of OCWs from the Philippines have gener-
ated new solidarities and forms of consciousness among Filipinos. On con-
struction sites in Saudi Arabia or Japan, at housemaids’ day-off meeting
places in Abu Dhabi, Hong Kong, Rome, and Singapore, in the basements
of hotels and hospitals in London and New York, and on the lower decks of
ocean-going freighters, Filipinos regularly congregate, eat together, swap
stories, and share news from the Philippines. In such venues, and increasingly
among friends and relatives back home, the lived experience of Filipino OCWs
is understood as that of subalterns, as overworked and underpaid, as exploited
and ill-treated Filipinos.37 In recent years, abuses suffered by Filipino OCWs—
murders in Tokyo, executions in Singapore, imprisonments in Abu Dhabi—
have led to widespread nationalist outrage, as seen in countless newspaper
articles, television shows, and demonstrations outside foreign embassies in
Manila.38
What we find in the Philippines, then, is not the conservative, hierarchical,
monarchical, official nationalism still entrenched—if under challenge—in
Thailand, but rather a distinctively popular form of nationalism. This popular
nationalism owes much to the experience of anti-Marcos struggle in the
1970s and 1980s, to the consumption of Philippine movies, television, and
pop music, and to the everyday struggles of OCWs. It is rooted firmly in the
lived experience of millions of ordinary Filipinos, and has been stimulated
and sustained not by “official nationalism” but rather by the creative energies
of Filipinos laboring outside—and often against—the Philippine state. The
contrast between this kind of nationalism and that found in Thailand could
not be sharper.
B U RMA AND I N D O N E S I A
If these differences between Thailand and the Philippines can be attributed to
enduring legacies of state formation, the different trajectories of nationalism
in Burma and Indonesia demand alternative bases of explanation given the
strikingly similar paths to independence taken by these two new nation-states.
Both British Burma and the Netherlands East Indies, after all, combined
increasingly direct colonial rule over core zones of intensive commercialized
agriculture (i.e., the Irrawaddy Delta, Java) with more attenuated and indirect
36 Benedict Anderson, Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity
Politics (Amsterdam: Centre for Asian Studies Amsterdam, 1992).
37 See, for example, Nicole Constable,Maid to Order in Hong Kong: Stories of Filipina Workers
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
38 Vicente Rafael, “Your Grief Is Our Gossip: Overseas Filipinos and other Spectral Presences,”
Public Culture 9, 2 (Winter 1997): 267–91.
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rule through “traditional rulers” in peripheral areas (e.g., the Shan States, the
Outer Islands) where natural resource extraction predominated. Both, more-
over, were “plural societies” in which the emerging market economies of the
core zones were strictly segmented along ethnic lines, with segregated and stig-
matized immigrant minority groups—Chettiar “Indians” and largely Hokkien-
speaking “Chinese”—serving as “pariah capitalist” merchants, moneylenders,
and middlemen between Western firms and the indigenous peasantry.39
Against this shared backdrop, a common pattern of nationalist mobiliz-
ation and nation-state formation was observable in Burma and the Indonesian
archipelago over the twentieth century. In both British Burma and the Nether-
lands East Indies, nationalist movements emerged during the interwar era
among urban educated youth on the fringes of the state in the core, commercia-
lized zones of colonial rule.40 In both Burma and the Indies, these movements
were enlisted and in some measure empowered by the Japanese occupying
forces during World War II. Their leaders were given symbolic positions of
authority and unprecedented opportunities to communicate with the population
at large, even as tens of thousands of nationalist youth were mobilized in mili-
tary or paramilitary units in advance of anticipated Allied attacks.41 In both
countries, attempts to restore colonial rule after the war ran aground when
they encountered mounting popular mobilization, which soon forced the
British and Dutch governments to cede independence to nationalist leaders.
Nationalism in Burma and Indonesia, then, shared a common point of
departure at independence. Unlike Thailand and the Philippines, nationalism
entailed large-scale popular mobilization and involved dislocation and destruc-
tion of state institutions. Anti-colonial struggles, moreover, combined with the
problematically “foreign” identities attributed to immigrant mercantile min-
orities under colonial rule to prefigure strong support for economic nationalism
and for state intervention to redistribute wealth, promote social welfare, and
prevent the “free hand” of the market from perpetuating control by “foreign”
(i.e., Indian, Chinese, and European) capital. Finally, the combination of
direct and indirect colonial rule in British Burma and the Netherlands East
Indies, the dislocations and difficulties of World War II, and the struggle for inde-
pendence left the processes of state formation and national integration incomplete.
The first decades following independence saw notable parallels in the
fates of nationalism in Burma and Indonesia. In both countries, the
39 John S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Nether-
lands India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948).
40 Daw Khin Yi, The Dobama Movement in Burma (1930–1938) (Ithaca: Cornell University
Southeast Asia Program, 1988); George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia
(Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 2003).
41 Dorothy Hess Guyot, “The Political Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Burma” (PhD diss.,
Yale University, 1966); Benedict Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resist-
ance, 1944–1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).
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inauguration of parliamentary democracy helped to absorb forces and energies
mobilized in World War II and the independence struggle, with demobilization
achieved largely through incorporation into the rapidly expanding agencies of
the two states. In both, the reconstitution of state authority along national lines
was enabled by expansion of the state’s role in the economy to promote econ-
omic nationalism and to meet the hopes for social redistribution raised by
popular participation in the independence struggle. However, state expansion,
absorptiveness, and inclusiveness was soon tempered by a trend towards the
centralization and insulation of state power. This tendency was already
evident in the first years of independence in the undermining of federal state
structures that outgoing colonial governments had imposed on Burmese and
Indonesian nationalist leaders.42
Such reversals helped to stimulate armed mobilization by forces claiming
to represent minorities disenfranchised and disadvantaged by the centralization
of power in Rangoon and Jakarta, with ethnic insurgencies in Burma soon fairly
matched by regional rebellions in Indonesia.43 These challenges, alongside
those mounted by armed guerrilla forces—Communist in Burma, Islamist in
Indonesia—whose ranks had mobilized in the independence struggle but
were later marginalized by nationalist leaders, represented a menace to the
fragile authority of the new nation-states. The Cold War also brought new
forms of foreign intervention that compromised national sovereignty: in
Burma, the U.S.-backed flight and encampment of Kuomintang forces
fleeing Communist rule in China in 1949–1951, and in Indonesia, U.S.
covert and military support for the regional rebellions in 1957–1959.44
In this shared context, the 1950s and the early to mid-1960s saw parallel
processes of deepening militarization, as in both Burma and Indonesia embryo-
nic national armed forces engaged in violent “pacification” and internal colo-
nization to preserve and enhance national sovereignty and state power. By
the late 1950s, experiments with martial law and expansion of military
powers in outlying regions of conflict had vastly increased army prerogatives
in Rangoon and Jakarta. The early-mid 1960s brought the onset of full-blown
military rule in both countries, precipitated by a coup in Rangoon in 1962 and a
42 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma (London: C. Hurst, 1987), 217–90; Benedict Anderson,
Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1990), 99–109.
43 Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Boulder: Westview Press,
1994); Martin T. Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books,
1999); Barbara S. Harvey, Permesta: Half a Rebellion (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia
Project, 1977); Cornelis van Dijk, Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indo-
nesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).
44 Robert H. Taylor, Foreign and Domestic Consequences of the KMT Intervention in Burma
(Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1973); Audrey R. Kahin and George McT.
Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia
(New York: New Press, 1995).
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coup and counter-coup in Jakarta in late 1965. By the mid-late 1960s, the fate
of nationalism was no longer dispersed among the highly mobilized, fractious
Burmese and Indonesian people, but rather concentrated in the hands of
increasingly insulated and narrowly centralized authoritarian regimes.
Despite these prominent similarities in their early post-independence tra-
jectories, by the mid-late 1960s Burmese and Indonesian nationalisms were
already showing signs of divergence, which continued to widen over succeed-
ing decades. In Burma, the army’s 1962 coup was not accompanied by a right-
ward shift in economic policy or geopolitical orientation, as seen in so many
U.S.-backed military regimes during the Cold War. Instead, the military
rulers committed themselves to promote the “Burmese Road to Socialism,”
enforcing economic autarchy while maintaining neutrality if not indifference
in the face of deepening U.S. intervention in Indochina and the abiding press-
ures of the Cold War.
This distinctively “isolationist” approach to national sovereignty and
economic independence can be understood in terms of Burma’s historical
experience of “foreign” penetration and its vulnerable location in the regional
context. Burma had been part of British India until 1937, and its small minority
of immigrant Indian merchants, moneylenders, and middleman had dominated
the colonial capital of Rangoon, occupied key niches in colonial state employ-
ment and urban wage labor, and controlled the commanding heights of the
densely commercialized core zone of wet-rice cultivation, the Irrawaddy
Delta, through landownership and control over credit, commercial networks,
and rice milling. Indian immigrants maintained close connections to their
neighboring homeland, leaving Burma a petty dependency within the vast
expanse of diasporic mercantile activity across the Indian Ocean.45
Indian immigrants were destined to be viewed as obstacles in the path of
Burmese nationalism, as seen in communal violence that accompanied nation-
alist mobilizing efforts in the late 1930s, and the goal of independence inevita-
bly meant independence from Indians as much as from British rule. When the
Japanese invaded in early 1942, tens of thousands of Indian immigrants, includ-
ing many colonial civil servants, army troops, and policemen, fled to India, and
those who remained or returned in the early aftermath of the war found them-
selves unwelcome in newly independent Burma. Government “nationalization”
and land redistribution policies largely eliminated their privileged position in
the economy, and citizenship restrictions rendered their continuing presence
in the country problematic. By 1962, the commitment to an economic nation-
alism that excluded Indian immigrant capital was established and difficult to
reverse. The years after the coup saw further emigration of Burma’s residual
45 Michael Adas, The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian
Rice Frontier, 1825–1941 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974).
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Indian population as the regime tightened restrictions on private economic
activity and citizenship.46
Deepening pursuit of economic nationalism through autarchy and anti-
immigrant policies combined with ethnic exclusiveness to constrain nation-
building in Burma under military rule from the early 1960s onwards.47 The
Burmese nationalist movement of the 1930s had been narrowly Burman; its
members were drawn from the commercialized rice-bowl areas of directly-
ruled British Ministerial Burma, and its identity and orientation largely
excluded various minorities populating indirectly-ruled areas of British
Burma and in Ministerial Burma itself. With Japanese invasion and occupation
during World War II, moreover, the narrowly ethnic-Burman complexion of
Burmese nationalism had only deepened, as the Japanese armed and empow-
ered ethnic-Burman nationalist leaders to fight the British colonial army with
its overwhelmingly Indian, Chin, Kachin, Karen, and otherwise non-Burman
regiments. Even as nationalists belatedly betrayed their Japanese sponsors
toward the end of the war and founded the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom
League (AFPFL), they continued to draw on the narrowly ethnic-Burman
organizational resources and identities established under Japanese tutelage,
and to regard representatives of Burma’s minorities as stooges for the restor-
ation of British rule.48 Thus when early postwar anti-colonial mobilization
championed by nationalist leaders spurred the British government to grant
independence in early 1948, the non-Burman minorities were weakly rep-
resented in the newly founded Union of Burma government. Federal provisions
for minority representation and autonomy were ill-defined and increasingly
ignored, and the years following independence saw the appearance and expan-
sion of separatist movements demanding independent homelands for the Chin,
Karen, Kachin, Mon, and Shan minorities.49
Under military rule from 1962, this situation combined with the abiding
ethnic narrowness and international vulnerability of the regime to constrain
the possibilities for effective national integration. Given the regime’s economic
autarchy and political isolationism, its efforts to impose military rule over the
entirety of Burma soon foundered, with armed separatist insurgencies taking
effective control over large swathes of minority-populated regions. Rangoon’s
weak fiscal base severely limited its ability to defeat the insurgencies or to
46 Nalini Ranjan Chakravarti, The Indian Minority in Burma: The Rise and Decline of an Immi-
grant Community (London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1971).
47 Robert H. Taylor, “Perceptions of Ethnicity in the Politics of Burma,” Southeast Asian
Journal of Social Science 10, 1 (1982): 7–22.
48 Andrew Selth, “Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945,” Modern Asian Studies 20, 3
(1986): 483–507.
49 Mikael Gravers, “The Karen Making of a Nation,” in Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv, eds.,
Asian Forms of the Nation (Richmond: Curzon, 1996), 237–69; Ashley South, Mon Nationalism
and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake (London: Routledge, 2003).
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construct a serious communications, education, and transportation infrastruc-
ture for national integration.50 In addition, as was already evident with the Kuo-
mintang invasion in the early 1950s, Burma’s location and the porosity of its
borders rendered effective enforcement of national sovereignty especially dif-
ficult. With China sponsoring the Burmese Communist Party’s armed insur-
gency until the late 1980s and Thailand abetting Karen and Shan
independence struggles, and with the international narcotics trade in the
“Golden Triangle” providing additional fiscal bases for effective autonomy if
not independence from Rangoon, stalemate persisted for decades. The military
regime in the late 1980s regained some effective sovereignty over its territory
with Rangoon’s rapprochement with both Beijing and Bangkok and the conse-
quent disappearance of foreign support for various separatist insurgencies. But
even today, instead of effective national integration in Burma there persists a
patchwork form of sovereignty based on a complex welter of ceasefire agree-
ments and live-and-let-live arrangements outside the core ethnic-Burman
areas.51
Whereas Burma developed a decidedly Mainland Southeast Asian pattern
of “essentialist” nationalism, in Indonesia a distinctly “Island” Southeast Asian
pattern of “epochalist” nation-building has unfolded since the onset of military
rule. Unlike in Burma, the strengthening of military rule under Suharto was
accompanied by a sharp reduction in economic nationalism, the opening of
the economy to foreign direct investment, and a shift to heavy reliance on
loans from foreign governments and international financial institutions.
Thanks to these flows of foreign capital and large oil and natural gas reserves,
the 1970s and 1980s were a period of sustained import-substitution industrial-
ization, followed in the mid-1980s by a decisive shift into export-oriented
industrialization, with foreign companies dominating the export sector.52
The diminution of economic nationalism in Indonesia in the mid-late
1960s was accompanied by a commensurate abandonment of anti-imperialist
nationalism in the political realm. In 1965 and 1966, Suharto engineered the
de-escalation of Konfrontasi with neighboring Malaysia (derided by Soekarno
as a British-controlled “neo-colony”), and in 1967 he helped to create the
Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), establishing Indonesia’s
newly found eagerness to strengthen relations with neighboring Malaysia,
Singapore (with its British military bases), and the Philippines and Thailand,
both deeply involved in the American war effort in Indochina. In the meantime,
even as Suharto’s lieutenants were orchestrating large-scale anti-communist
50 Josef Silverstein, Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1977).
51 Ashley South, Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conflict (London: Routledge, 2008).
52 Jeffrey A. Winters, Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1996).
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pogroms in late 1965 and early 1966, he was forging a close Cold War alliance
with the United States.53 Thus, in contrast with Burma, the fate of nationalism
in Indonesia from the mid-1960s was one in which hopes of achieving greater
independence from foreign economic control and efforts to confront and
oppose imperialist meddling in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia
were essentially abandoned in favor of integration into the world capitalist
economy and the global political order dominated by the United States.
The advantages accruing to the national government in Jakarta from its
opening to foreign investment and finance, its embrace of the United States,
and its access to oil and natural gas reserves, together with the formative
history of Indonesian nationalism, allowed far easier, more extensive, and
more fully internalized national integration across the sprawling archipelago
after the late 1960s than occurred in autarchic, “isolationist” Burma during
the same period. After all, Indonesian nationalism had from the outset been
much more open and inclusive, with a dialect of Malay—rather than Java-
nese—adopted and adapted as the national language (Bahasa Indonesia), Com-
munist and Islamic organizations, ideologies, and idioms incorporated into the
national struggle, and prominent figures from beyond Java included in the lea-
dership of the nationalist struggle. During the Revolusi of 1945–1949, armed
guerrilla-style struggle by the fledgling Republik Indonesia against Dutch
efforts to restore colonial rule was highly localized and diverse in its recruit-
ment, leadership, and command structure. The Republican leadership signaled
its commitment to a broadly conceived “Indonesia” by jettisoning of provisions
for Islamic law in the Indonesian Constitution in favor of more ambiguously
worded references to religious faith, and by adopting the celebrated multicul-
tural slogan Bhinneka Tunggal Ika—Unity in Diversity. Even the major
“regional rebellions” of the 1950s—Darul Islam Indonesia, and Pemerintah
Revolusioner Republik Indonesia—were framed in terms of aspirations for a
different kind of Indonesia, rather than for new nation-states per se.54
Such inclusive nationalism, along with the advantages that accompanied
Indonesia’s mid-1960s re-incorporation into the world capitalist economy
and the Cold War geo-political order, promoted a discernible intensification
of national integration across the archipelago. Oil revenue and foreign capital
fuelled expansion of a national market, bureaucracy, educational system, and
media, in the national language, Bahasa Indonesia. Under Suharto’s highly
insulated and repressive rule, Jakarta wielded centralized control over the pro-
vinces for three decades, managing manifold national state enterprises,
53 John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup
d’état in Indonesia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Bradley R. Simpson, Econom-
ists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2008).
54 Anderson, Language and Power, 123–51; and Imagined Communities, 120–22.
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implementing diverse national programs, and rotating civilian and military offi-
cials across the sprawling archipelago with ease. These achievements had
lasting effects on Indonesians’ sense of connectedness and shared experience
with their fellow countrymen.55
Given the regime’s close alliance with the United States, Jakarta was able
to consolidate and extend Indonesian national sovereignty without the compli-
cations and compromises suffered by Rangoon. By the late 1960s, the United
Nations’ transitional stewardship in West Papua gave way to incorporation of
“Irian Jaya” into Indonesia through a dubious “viva voce” referendum accepted
in Washington, D.C. and at UN headquarters in New York.56 When in late 1975
the national liberation movement Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-
Leste Independente) declared independence in the former Portuguese colony
of East Timor, Indonesia invaded and forcibly occupied the country, imposing
harsh direct military rule until 1999. Here too, despite egregious human rights
abuses and sustained violation of international law, Indonesia enjoyed effective
U.S. support against the threat of the left-wing Fretilin. As in West Papua and
Aceh (where a separatist movement developed in the late 1970s), popular
armed struggle for independence was confronted by a highly militarized Indo-
nesian state whose oil wealth, sustained industrial growth, and foreign support
made it much stronger than its Burmese counterpart.57
As in Burma, then, the early post-independence era witnessed the inexor-
able reconstitution and reassertion of state power in national terms and the “fos-
silization” and forced encapsulation of the diverse energies and social forces
mobilized in the Revolusi, but these processes were followed by three
decades of sustained industrialization and accompanying social and political
transformations that led a different fate for Indonesian nationalism by the
end of the century.58 Under Suharto, Indonesians of Chinese ancestry suffered
stigmatization, discrimination in state employment and education, extortion,
harassment, and occasional attacks.59 Yet unlike Indians in Burma, ethnic-
Chinese Indonesians had contributed to the nationalist struggle, and instead
of expropriation and expulsion, they were afforded greater opportunities for
55 Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Daniel
Dhakidae, “The State, the Rise of Capital, and the Fall of Political Journalism: Political Economy of
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56 John Saltford, The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua, 1962–1969:
The Anatomy of a Betrayal (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).
57 Benedict Anderson, ed., Violence and the State in Suharto’s Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Southeast Asia Program, 2001).
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(Oct. 2002): 1–19.
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citizenship and roles as “pariah entrepreneurs” in the rapidly industrializing and
expanding economy.60
Under Suharto, avowedly authentic “indigenous” mechanisms of author-
itarian control were woven out of the rich cultural and ethnic tapestry of the
archipelago. The state was restyled as protector of diverse cultures and tra-
ditions, and as embodying notions of authority deeply rooted in traditional
culture.61 The largely appointed supra-parliamentary body that “(re)elected”
Suharto to the presidency every five years was called the People’s Consultative
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), with musyawarah—consul-
tation, consensus—celebrated as having a genuine legitimacy among Indone-
sians that competition between rival candidates, parties, ideologies, and
social forces could not claim. By the 1990s, the regime also began a concerted
effort to celebrate and appropriate the majority faith of the archipelago, Islam.62
Overall, the Indonesian state was repositioned as both authentic embodiment of
the Indonesian nation and as sole guarantor of national integrity in the midst of
potentially fractious cultural, ethnic, regional, and religious diversity.
Yet unlike nationalism in the context of economic stagnation and social
stasis in Burma, in Indonesia the dramatic social transformations accompany-
ing three decades of rapid, sustained industrialization and economic growth
generated new possibilities for “reimagining” the nation. By the 1990s, a
vibrant, increasingly urbanized society was rapidly outgrowing the centralized
authoritarian state. When, in mid-1998, Suharto was forced to resign amidst
economic crisis and popular protests, there was a rapid and decisive reconfi-
guration of the nation-state, colored by contestation and violent conflict.63
As the shift from centralized authoritarian rule to competitive elections
and decentralization began to take place, Indonesia’s tremendous diversity
seemed to threaten violent disintegration of the nation-state. Large-scale riots
in Jakarta targeted Indonesia’s ethnic-Chinese minority in 1998, inter-ethnic
violence in Kalimantan and inter-religious conflict in Maluku and Sulawesi
caused large-scale hardship and displacement in 1999–2001, and paramilitary
mobilization and terrorist bombings raised the specter of Islamist jihad. A
United Nations-supervised referendum in East Timor in August 1999 led to a
vote overwhelmingly in favor of independence and, despite violent military-led
resistance, forced termination of Indonesia’s long occupation. These events in
East Timor and ongoing democratization across the archipelago encouraged
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renewed mobilizations for independence in Aceh and West Papua.64 Indonesia,
it appeared, was destined to go the way of Yugoslavia, as Suharto’s army gen-
erals—like their Burmese counterparts—had been warning of for years.
This alarmist scenario proved decidedly false. The “anti-Chinese” riots of
May 1998, after all, had been orchestrated by the generals themselves, and with
Suharto’s departure violence against the ethnic-Chinese effectively ceased. In
subsequent years, ethnic-Chinese Indonesians saw a dramatic easing of restric-
tions on their cultural, political, and religious freedoms, and a reduction of
impediments to naturalization for those lacking Indonesian citizenship. Inter-
ethnic and inter-religious violence faded away, and Islamist terrorism remained
highly limited in scope.65
The putative threat of territorial dismemberment diminished dramatically
following the much-exaggerated panic of 1999. East Timor had never been part
of the Netherlands East Indies territories that Soekarno and his fellow
colonial-era nationalists had envisaged as an independent Indonesia. Further-
more, the Indonesian occupation had always been illegal under international
law, and the territory remained a fiefdom of the Indonesian military establish-
ment, even after its formal incorporation as a province of the country.66 Much
to the disappointment of activists in Aceh and West Papua, independence for
East Timor did not establish a precedent for further breakaway new nations,
given the weaker basis of mobilization on the ground and more limited
foreign sympathy for their causes. Instead, as Indonesia had embarked on
comprehensive decentralization in 1999, with locally elected parliaments and
local executives enjoying unprecedented powers over state agencies, “special
autonomy” packages were extended to West Papua and Aceh, and, in the
latter case this proved sufficiently attractive to spur the Free Aceh Movement
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) to abandon armed struggle in favor of
parliamentary politics.67 Overall, then, Indonesia did not suffer the unresolved
problems of national integration as did authoritarian Burma, and instead the
first decade of this century saw nationalism reemerge not only intact but
arguably more inclusive and elastic, under conditions of democratization and
decentralization.
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C O L D WAR F E D E R A L I S M S F O R C E D , FA I L E D , A N D F U D G E D :
I N D O C H I N A A N D MA L AY S I A
We have seen that legacies of colonial-era state formation combined with press-
ures of the Cold War international context to prefigure dramatic divergences in
the fate of nationalism between Thailand and the Philippines, and between
Burma and Indonesia. Their impacts on the making of the three new nation-
states of Indochina—Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—and Malaysia in the post-
independence era, were likewise decisive. There, the differences between
“Mainland” and “Island” forms of nation-state formation in Southeast Asia
and between alternative niches for national reintegration into the Cold
War-era geopolitical order were especially notable and significant. The division
of Indochina into Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam and the formation of the Fed-
eration of Malaysia provide a final, illuminating paired comparison for close
consideration.
As Christopher Goscha has demonstrated, French colonial rule created—
however imperfectly, incompletely, and unevenly—the possibilities for the
imagining of an “Indochine” across the territories of Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam. French officials and “native” Annamese and Tonkinese clerks circu-
lated for decades across the full extent of colonial Indochine; speakers of
Khmer, Lao, and Vietnamese were, in small numbers, classmates in French
schools, most notably the Université de l’Indochine. The colonial economy
drew Tonkinese and Annamese laborers onto Cambodian rubber plantations,
and trade along the Mekong tightened connections between Saigon and thou-
sands of Lao- and Khmer-speaking rice farmers in the hinterlands. Small
wonder that Ho Chi Minh and his fellow revolutionaries had founded the Indo-
chinese Communist Party in 1930, and that as late as 1945 there was still much
debate over alternative—Indochinese versus Vietnamese—understandings of
the ultimate goals of the independence struggle.68
However, hopes and dreams for an independent, unified Indochine began
to run aground by the 1950s, constrained by both colonial legacies of state for-
mation and Cold War exigencies in the region. Petty clerks, plantation workers,
small-scale rice traders, and other émigrés from Annam and Tonkin had headed
west into Cambodge and Laos under colonial rule, but flows eastwards con-
sisted largely of rice and other agricultural commodities rather than Khmer
and Lao speakers. Therefore, the imagination and allure of a unified Indochine
was limited largely to the Vietnamese-speaking circuitries of the colonial state
and economy. In this same period the French, to shore up the problematic,
porous borders of Laos and Cambodge in response to enduring, close connec-
tions to, and territorial claims by, Siam (and, by the 1930s, an irredentist
68 Christopher E. Goscha, Vietnam or Indochina? Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese
Nationalism, 1887–1954 (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1995), 13–95.
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“Thailand”), began to encourage the reinforcement and reinvention of dis-
tinctly Lao and Cambodian conceptions of cultural, religious, and ethnic iden-
tity. These policies rendered increasingly problematic the potential
incorporation of Laos and Cambodia into a unified independent Indochine
dominated by Annamese and Tonkinese.
The possibilities for an independent Indochine were largely foreclosed by
external pressures early in the Cold War era. Under Soviet pressure, the Indo-
chinese Communist Party was formally dissolved, with separate parties for
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam formally constituted in 1951, although Cambo-
dian and Laotian comrades were guided by Vietnamese counterparts in Hanoi
as they fought the French colonial army. The French regime, working to
confine the revolutionary struggle for independence within Vietnam, in the
early 1950s enhanced the formal status of Laos and Cambodia within the
French Indochinese Union. Both were then granted formal independence as
part of 1954 Geneva Accords, which recognized the sovereignty of the three
new nation-states while forestalling unification of Vietnam. The dearth of inter-
national support for a unified independent Indochine was evident in Soviet and
Chinese pressures on the Vietnamese Communist leadership to accept for-
mation of separate Communist Parties in 1951, and then to sign the Accords.69
Yet the legacies of French colonial Indochine lived on in subsequent
decades, decisively coloring relations between the three new nation-states for
years to come. From the mid-1950s through the Communist victories of
1975, Vietnamese Communist Party leaders maintained significant influence
among the Pathet Lao and the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party.70
Access to Laos and Cambodia allowed Vietnamese forces to infiltrate guerril-
las, arms, and logistical support for the fight against successive American-
backed governments in southern Vietnam, and the United States widened its
counterinsurgency and bombing campaigns to cover the breadth of Indo-
china.71 When Communist forces seized Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Vientiane
in 1975, they did so in an effort driven if not dictated by Hanoi.72
In the mid-1970s, national integration began to develop, belatedly, across
the three new nation-states of former French Indochina. With “Reunification”
in Vietnam, the complicated history of attenuated imperial control of the
Cochinchinese frontier from Hué and the hybrid cultural, ethnic, and religious
69 Ibid., 96–146.
70 Chistopher E. Goscha, “Vietnam and the World Outside: The Case of Vietnamese Advisers in
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ment, 1955–1975 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
72 Christopher E. Goscha and Thomas Engelbert, Falling Out of Touch: Vietnamese Communist
Policy towards an Emerging Cambodian Communist Movement (1930–1975) (Clayton, Victoria:
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complexion of the Mekong Delta were obscured in favor of an official nation-
alist narrative stressing restoration of a timeless Viet Nam long besieged by
external enemies. Differences between the two parts of Vietnam separated by
war from 1954 through 1975 were ascribed to residual neocolonial American
influences and attacked as foreign pathologies to be eradicated in the extension
of Communist control over southern society.73 In Laos, consolidation of Com-
munist control and socialist transformation required substantial external assist-
ance, and Vietnamese advisors oversaw efforts to construct a coherent
party-state and collectivize agriculture across the country.74
In Cambodia, on the other hand, where the French had constructed the
notion of a Khmer identity resurrected from the premodern Angkorean
empire and threatened with extinction, the impulse to assert national indepen-
dence was much greater, and Vietnamese hegemony was resisted.75 The Com-
munist Party of Kampuchea undertook drastic internal purges to eliminate
Vietnamese influence, embarked on a desperate, genocidal drive to achieve
economic autonomy and political control over the countryside, and provoked
border disputes with Vietnam.76 By late 1978 Cambodia and Vietnam were
at war, and in early 1979 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, occupying the country
despite enduring opposition from the United States, Thailand, and other U.S.
allies in Southeast Asia, as well as the People’s Republic of China, which
fought brief border wars with Vietnam in 1979 and 1981.77
Overall, although colonial-era state formation had made an independent
Indochine imaginable as an object of nationalist struggle and plausible as a
unified, if perhaps federalized, new nation-state, Cold War circumstances dic-
tated otherwise. French maneuvers to forestall decolonization together with
American, Soviet, and Chinese policies encouraged the creation of separate
national states, Communist parties, and, in due course, party-states in Cambo-
dia, Laos, and Vietnam. But the struggle to “reunify” Vietnam through 1975
spilled over into Cambodia and Laos, and processes of post-1975 national inte-
gration in Cambodia led to efforts to assert the embryonic party-state’s national
independence from Vietnamese hegemony, leading to violence and Vietnamese
invasion and occupation. In all three countries, achievement of national
73 Philip Taylor, Fragments of the Present: Searching for Modernity in Vietnam’s South
(Honolulu: University of Hawaìi Press, 2000); Patricia M. Pelley, Postcolonial Vietnam: New His-
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independence and establishment of a national party-state from 1975 entailed
entrenchment of decidedly “Mainland” Southeast Asian forms of official
nationalism, with essentialized notions of Khmer, Lao, and Vietnamese
ethnic identities promoted at the expense of diverse hybridities and connections
across Indochina’s historically porous borders. Only the opening of the Cam-
bodian, Lao, and Vietnamese economies and a loosening of party-state
control from the 1990s have brought greater tolerance for the rich diversity
of cultural, ethnic, and religious life within and across the three nation-states.
Even so, there remains a strong discourse of protecting Khmer, Lao, and Viet-
namese identities against the ravages of globalization.
This pattern of nation-state formation in former French Indochina differs
markedly from the fate of nationalism across the various British colonial
territories that developed as the Federation of Malaysia (and Singapore)
from the 1950s into the early to mid-1960s. As elsewhere across “Island”
Southeast Asia, the Malay Peninsula and the northern shelf of Borneo had,
since the fall of Malacca to the Portuguese in 1511, seen fragmentation of
political authority into petty sultanates, and over the next three centuries
neither conversion of coastal rulers and their subjects to Islam nor the estab-
lishment of successive Portuguese, Dutch, and British trading forts created
any overarching framework for centralized state formation or identity con-
struction. The consolidation of British power from the late eighteenth
century onwards was accomplished in a piecemeal fashion, with directly
ruled Straits Settlements in Malacca, Penang, and Singapore, with Residents
later imposed over the states of the Malay Peninsula. The Sultanate of
Brunei, the British North Borneo Company’s territory in Sabah, and the
Brooke dynasty’s empire in Sarawak were not under direct British colonial
rule; all three retained separate, protected status instead. This pattern of pre-
colonial and colonial-era state formation across the sprawling hodgepodge of
territories that became Malaysia provided a fragile historical basis for a new
nation-state, arguably much weaker than the Indochinese prospects of what
would become Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.78
In addition, the unparalleled extent of immigration into the Malay Penin-
sula, northern Borneo, Penang, and Singapore problematized the articulation of
“Mainland”-style nationalism(s) based on essentialized notions of authentic,
indigenous ethnic core population(s) there. From the late eighteenth century,
migration from southern China had created sizeable mining communities in
the Malay Peninsula and northern Borneo. Over the subsequent century and
a half of deepening integration into the British imperial economy the
harbors, mills, and sweatshops of various port towns and cities swelled with
78 William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1967).
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Hokkien- and Teochiu-speaking laborers.79 Combined with the thousands of
rubber plantation laborers recruited from India in the late colonial era, these
immigrants made up the working class of what would come to be known as
Malaysia, and they matched and often outnumbered the sparsely scattered
Malay-speaking peasant population, as seen most dramatically in overwhel-
mingly “Chinese” Singapore. In the Malay Peninsula, the “Malay” population
increased considerably through steady migration from the Netherlands East
Indies. These huge immigrant populations, combined with the patchwork
pattern of state formation, made for a very fragile basis for nationalism in a
unified “Malaysia.”80
Nevertheless, Cold War circumstances conspired to enable an agglomera-
tion of these disparate territories into what would prove to be—with the excep-
tion of Singapore—the basis for an enduring federalized nation-state. By the
time the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the armed guerrilla units of
the Communist-controlled Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army effectively
controlled many towns and cities across the Peninsula, and the restoration
and reconstitution of British colonial rule—under the Malayan Union from
1946–1948, and the Federation of Malaya from 1948–1963—encountered
strong resistance from the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which also main-
tained strength in the “Red City” of Singapore. On the Malay Peninsula, the
British succeeded in defeating the MCP through counterinsurgency operations,
hamletting of rural communities in “New Villages,” and creation of the
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) as a British- and Chinese business-
backed patronage network to counter the overwhelmingly ethnic-Chinese
MCP. At the same time, a carefully stage-managed decolonization was effected
on the Peninsula, with the British gradually handing over power to a coalition
of Chinese business elites in the MCA and Malay aristocrats, the latter now
mobilized as the United Malays’ National Organisation (UMNO). In 1957,
more than a decade after Aung San, Ho Chi Minh, and Soekarno had respect-
ively declared independence in Burma, Vietnam, and Indonesia, a “National
Alliance” government of the UMNO, the MCA, and the Malaysian Indian Con-
gress (MIC) was handed power, as Lee Kuan Yew famously noted, “on a silver
platter with red ribbons by British royalty in uniform.”81
Although in the Malay Peninsula the British effectively transferred power
to a conservative, compliant, “neocolonial” government, fervently
anti-communist and fully open to foreign capital, in Singapore and the northern
shelf of Borneo Cold War tensions and uncertainties persisted well into the
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1960s. The MCP remained a powerful force within the dominant People’s
Action Party (PAP) in Singapore, which was granted formal independence in
1959 but was compelled to accept a continuing British military presence and
involvement in the city-state’s internal security. Meanwhile, Soekarno’s Indo-
nesia supported left-wing mobilization among ethnic-Chinese mining commu-
nities in Sarawak, among the local population on Brunei, and in parts of Sabah,
and also the goal of an independent federation of North Kalimantan. Prospects
for Communist takeover in Singapore, and for left-wing Soekarnoist anti-
imperialism in the remaining British territories, loomed large on the horizon.
The period from 1962–1963 saw London-led movement toward the for-
mation of a broadly-based Malaysia that would subsume these disparate
hotbeds of left-wing activism within a federation dominated by the “pacified,”
politically conservative heartlands of the Malay Peninsula. In 1962, the
left-wing Partai Rakyat Brunei was suppressed and forcibly disbanded
amidst a failed popular rebellion, and in 1963 moves towards formation of
the Federation of Malaysia were advanced by British officials in London, the
Federation of Malaya government in Kuala Lumpur, and conservative elements
within the PAP in Singapore led by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. In May
1963, a Federation of Malaysia expanded to include Sabah, Sarawak, and
Singapore was proclaimed despite resistance by the left-wing Sarawak
United People’s Party (SUPP) and, in Sabah, by the Pasok Momogun (Indigen-
ous Peoples’) party, even as MCP cadres were being rounded up by the security
services under “Operation Cold Storm” in Singapore. The formation of this
“neo-colony” was bitterly opposed by Indonesia’s Soekarno, leading to two
years of armed hostilities on Borneo (Konfrontasi). The overthrow of Soekarno
and the decimation of the PKI in late 1965, however, spelled Indonesian
acquiescence in the incorporation of Sabah and Sarawak into Malaysia, with
the Indonesian Army violently eliminating sources of refuge and support for
residual SUPP resistance to Malaysia in Sarawak in 1967. With the exit of
the now MCP-free Singapore from the Federation in 1965 due to frictions
between the PAP and the UMNO-led government in Kuala Lumpur, the
contours of Malaysia were now firmly fixed.82
Given the shallow historical roots of this new nation-state, the fate of
nationalism in Malaysia should perhaps be viewed retrospectively as having
been highly uncertain in the early years of the country’s existence. Indeed,
the mid-late 1960s saw a dramatic decline in the strength of the ruling “National
Front” coalition between UMNO and the MCA in Kuala Lumpur, and the May
1969 elections threatened to permit a political turnover not seen since Indepen-
dence in 1957. But violence in the aftermath of the elections provided an
excuse for proclamation of emergency rule and for elaboration of a New
82 Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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Economic Policy the following year as a new strategy for managing the “plural
society” inherited from colonial rule. In the British colonial government’s racial
classification scheme, the category of “Malay” incorporated recent migrants
from the neighboring Netherlands East Indies and offered special “protection”
to such supposed “natives” in the face of steady (British-induced) flows of
immigrant labor.83 This protected status for “Malays” was noted in the 1957
Constitution, and, under the New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1970
onwards it was extended to serve as the basis for affirmative action (via
quotas, preferential loans, and hiring schemes) in favor of “Sons of the Soil”
(Bumiputra).84 Under the NEP, the avowed aim of creating a Bumiputra
business class through vastly expanded forms of state intervention and owner-
ship in the economy strengthened both the federal government’s powers across
Malaysia and UMNO’s political position in Malaysian politics, achieving
unbroken hegemony well into the twenty-first century, with no turnover in
national politics.85 The federal system drew state-level elites in distant Sabah
and Sarawak into alliance with UMNO, even as the federal government’s
growing reach made inclusion in Malaysia increasingly meaningful and materi-
ally rewarding for “native sons” in far-flung northern Borneo, who con-
veniently qualified as Bumiputra.86 The hodgepodge of largely unconnected
former British territories muddled through the first decades following the for-
mation of “Malaysia,” with promotion of an “indigenous” national bourgeoisie
serving as an attractive basis for inclusion within the new nation-state and an
effective rubric for expanding national state power.
C O N C L U S I O N S
Viewed from the early twenty-first century, the fate of nationalism in the new
nation-states of Southeast Asia no longer appears—even retrospectively—as
uncertain as described by Geertz in his landmark essays of 1973. With the
benefit of hindsight, the tensions between “essentialism” and “epochalism”
and the conflicts between “primordial sentiments” and “civil politics” once
identified and emphasized by Geertz no longer seem to have been so crucial
to the varying fates of nationalism across the region. Nor do the diverging
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trajectories of nationalism in post-independence Southeast Asia appear explic-
able in terms of constellations of ethnic diversity and their variously enabling or
impeding impact on the imperative of national integration. Apparently improb-
able new nation-states—Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos—have seemingly settled
quite comfortably into nationhood over the years, with little remaining fear
of dissolution. Even in Burma, ethnic separatist movements remain weak,
with the military regime exercising more effective national sovereignty over
its territory today than ever before. For better and for worse (just ask around
in Pattani or West Papua, Mae Sot or Maguindanao), the fate of various nation-
alisms across Southeast Asia now appear to be firmly fixed. East Timor’s inde-
pendence is the sole exception that proves this impressively un-falsified
Andersonian rule.
How, then, can we explain the variations observed across Southeast Asia
in the trajectories of nationalism over the past several decades since the tran-
sitions to independence in the 1940s and 1950s? As I have argued, the diver-
ging fates of nationalism in the region can be understood from a perspective
very different from that suggested by Geertz. The crucial questions, challenges,
cleavages, and conflicts facing the new nation-states of Southeast Asia, it has
been shown, were not those of “national integration” in contexts of “internal”
ethnic diversity, but those concerning (re)integration into the world capitalist
economy and the Cold War geopolitical order. Whether cast in terms of
imposed constraints or ideological choices, the ways in which various nation-
states negotiated their international relations served as critical determinants of
nationalist (de)mobilization, nation-building, and nationhood. How else to
understand the conspicuous similarities between Thailand and the Philippines,
the belated divergence between Burmese and Indonesian nationalism, or the
disparity between successful federation-making in Malaysia and federation-
breaking in Indochina? The consequences of capitalist development and the
circumstances of the Cold War era smiled far more favorably on some
nationalisms than on others.
The variegated fate of nationalism across Southeast Asia in the post-
independence era was also profoundly shaped by enduring legacies of state for-
mation in the region. Indeed, as I have shown, the meanings and trajectories of
nationalism differed markedly across the “Mainland”/“Island” divide along
lines familiar from early modern Southeast Asian history. They have prefigured
much more exclusivist and essentialized forms of official nationalism in inde-
pendent Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam than the more inclus-
ive and openly constructed forms found in Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Singapore. Furthermore, variegated patterns of colonial-era
state formation in Southeast Asia proved crucial for shaping the parameters
of the possible in the making of post-independence national identities across
the region. The boundaries, identities, and institutions of new nation-states
were variously enabled and constrained by absolutist centralization under the
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Chakkri dynasty in Siam, decentralized colonial democracy in the Philippines
in the American era, deepening incorporation and bureaucratization of local
aristocracies in the Netherlands East Indies, and the complex patchwork of
direct and indirect rule found in British Burma and greater “Malaya,” as well
as French Indochina. The varying treatment of immigrant minorities and
their offspring, categorization and reconfiguration of ethnic and religious
differences, and choices of state languages, nomenclatures, and boundaries in
various ways survived the transitions from colonial rule to independent nation-
states. The expulsion of Indians from Burma and the varying pattern of incor-
poration of “the Chinese” in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand
serve as obvious examples, as does Bahasa Indonesia, or the very notion of
“Laos.” After independence, Southeast Asian nationalists made new nation-
states, but not in circumstances of their own choosing or materials of their
own construction.
Beyond Southeast Asia, this revisionist account suggests the illuminative
power of a comparative historical sociology of nationalism attentive to patterns
of state- and identity-formation, and to the broader international economic and
political context within which new nation-states are enfolded. As the differ-
ences between various Mainland and Island Southeast Asian countries have
suggested, and as scholars working on other regions of the world have also
shown, the underlying logics of nationalism may exhibit profound differences,
differences prefigured by diverging patterns in the formation of states rather
than varying “national characters” or ethnic constellations.87 While Geertz
emphasized and perhaps exaggerated the challenges of managing cultural
diversity and the existential problems inherent in “nation-building” in the
new states of post-independence Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, this
essay has offered a reminder of the importance of state institutions, economic
power, and international relations in shaping the fate of nationalism across the
postcolonial world.
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